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We reconsider the three well-known solutions: the Nash, the egal-
itarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions, to the classical domains
of convex bargaining problems. A new proof for the Nash solution
that highlights the crucial role the axiom Contraction Independence
plays is provided. We also give new axiomatic characterizations for
both the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Our results
focus on both contraction and expansion independence properties of
bargaining problems and, as a consequence, some new insights on the
three solutions from the perspective of rational choice may be derived.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper reconsiders some well-known solutions to convex bargaining prob-
lems. Our purpose is two-fold. First, we provide a new proof for the Nash
solution that highlights the crucial role the axiom Contraction Independence
plays. Our proof method is proof-by-contradiction. Secondly, by employing
similar proof methods as for the Nash solution, we provide new axiomatic
characterizations for both the egalitarian and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solu-
tions. Instead of using any monotonicity type axiom, which is commonly
used in the literature for characterizing these two solutions (see, for exam-
ple, Kalai (1977), Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975); see also Peters (1992) and
Thomson (1994) for excellent surveys), we use variants of Contraction Inde-
pendence and Expansion Independence to characterize the egalitarian and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions. Both Contraction Independence and Ex-
pansion Independence properties ﬁgure prominently in the theory of rational
choice. Our new characterizations therefore may shed some new insights into
the three well-known solutions to bargaining problems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a
basic framework for the subsequent analysis. Section 3 presents the axioms.
Our main results and their proofs are contained in Section 4. Section 5 makes
several concluding remarks.
2B a s i c M o d e l
For any x,y ∈ Rn
+, we write x > y as [xi ≥ yi for all i ∈ N and x 6= y]a n d
x À y as [xi >y i for all i ∈ N].
Let π be a permutation of N. For all x =( xi)i∈N ∈ Rn
+,l e tπ(x)=
(xπ(i))i∈N. Π denotes the set of all permutations of N.
Let Σ be the set of all compact, convex, and comprehensive subsets of
Rn
+, each of which contains an interior point of Rn
+.E l e m e n t s i n Σ are
interpreted as normalized bargaining problems.F o ra l lA ∈ Σ and any π ∈ Π,
let π(A)={π(a) | a ∈ A}. For all A ∈ Σ, A is a symmetric problem if
A = π(A)f o ra l lπ ∈ Π.
For any x ∈ Rn
+ and α ∈ Rn
++,l e tα(x) ≡ (αixi)i∈N.G i v e nA ∈ Σ and
α ∈ Rn
++,l e tα(A) ≡
©
α(x) ∈ Rn
+ | x ∈ A
ª
. For any A in Rn
+,w ed e ﬁne the





+ | ∃x ∈ A : z ≤ x
ª
.
2Let the convex hull of A be denoted by conA. The convex hull of compA
will be called the convex and comprehensive hull of A, and will be denoted
by concompA.
A bargaining problem A ∈ Σ is strictly comprehensive if and only if
its boundary set constitutes the set of eﬃcient utility points on A.L e t u s
denote the set of strictly comprehensive problems by Σsc.G i v e nx,y ∈ Rn
+, x
is lexicographically greater than y if there are permutation π ∈ Π and i ∈ N
such that xπ(i) >y π(i) and xπ(j) = yπ(j) for any π(j) < π(i).
A bargaining solution F is a single-valued mapping from Σ to Rn
+ such
that for every bargaining problem A ∈ Σ, F (A) ∈ A.F o rg i v e nF (A) ∈ A,
let Fi (A) ∈ R+ be its i-th component.
Deﬁnition 1: A bargaining solution F NA : Σ → Rn
+ is the Nash solution if
for every A ∈ Σ,
F







Deﬁnition 2: A bargaining solution FK : Σ → Rn
+ is the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solution if for every A ∈ Σ, FK(A) ∈ A implies that: (1) there is no other
a ∈ A such that a À F K(A); and (2) there exists γ ∈ (0,1) such that
FK(A)=γ · m(A).
Deﬁnition 3: A bargaining solution FE : Σ → Rn
+ is the egalitarian solution
if for every A ∈ Σ, FE(A) ∈ A implies that: (1) there is no other a ∈ A
such that a À F E(A); and (2) F E
i (A)=F E
j (A) for all i,j ∈ N.
3A x i o m s
We consider the following axioms:
Eﬃciency: For all A ∈ Σ, there is no x ∈ A such that x >F(A).
Weak Eﬃciency: For all A ∈ Σ,t h e r ei sn ox ∈ A such that x À F (A).
Symmetry: For all A ∈ Σ,i f A is symmetric, then Fi (A)=Fj (A) for all
i,j ∈ N.
3Scale Invariance: For all A,B ∈ Σ,a n da l lα ∈ Rn
++,i f B = α(A), then
F (B)=α(F (A)).
Contraction Independence: For all A,B ∈ Σ,i f A ⊇ B and F (A) ∈ B,
then F (B)=F (A).
Weak Contraction Independence: For all A,B ∈ Σ such that m(A)=
m(B),i f A ⊇ B and F (A) ∈ B, then F (B)=F (A).
Expansion Independence: For all A,B ∈ Σ,i fA ⊆ B and F (A) is
eﬃcient on B,t h e nF (B)=F (A).
Weak Expansion Independence: For all A,B ∈ Σ such that m(A)=
m(B),i f A ⊆ B and F (A) is eﬃcient on B, then F (B)=F (A).
The ﬁrst ﬁve axioms are standard ones discussed in the literature on convex
bargaining problems (see, for example, Peters (1992) and Thomson (1994)
for discussions). The last three are new and deserve further discussions.
Weak Contraction Independence is weaker than Contraction Independence.
It restricts its applicability to contraction situations in which the ideal point
remains unchanged. Expansion Independence requires that, when a bargain-
ing problem A is enlarged to another bargaining problem B,i ft h es o l u t i o n
F(A)t oA continues to be eﬃcient on B,t h e nF(A)s h o u l dc o n t i n u et ob e
the solution to the bargaining problem B. The idea is that, even though
there is an enlargement of “opportunities” from A to B,g i v e nt h a tF(A)i s
both eﬃcient on A and on B,a n dt h a tF(A) is already the solution to the
original problem A, any movement away from F(A) will hurt at least one
player, and thus the solution to the enlarged problem B should continue to
be F(A). This requirement suggests a solidarity type property embedded in
the solution. This can also be seen as stating a certain inertia of the choice
process. Weak Expansion Independence is weaker than Expansion Indepen-
dence in that it restricts its applicability to situations where the ideal point
remains unchanged.
We note that our Expansion Independence axiom is logically weaker than
the following axiom, Independence of Undominated Alternatives,w h i c hi s
proposed in Thomson and Myerson (1980):
Independence of Undominated Alternatives: For all A,B ∈ Σ,i f
A ⊆ B and F (A) is weakly eﬃcient on B,t h e nF (B)=F (A).
4It is worth noting that Contraction Independence and Expansion Indepen-
dence are logically implied by the Monotonicity axiom, which is introduced
by Kalai (1977), together with Weak Eﬃciency, but the converse relation does
not hold. In fact, the monotone path solution, which is proposed by Thomson
and Myerson (1980) and which is characterized by Weak Eﬃciency and the
monotonicity axiom of Kalai (1977), satisﬁes both Contraction Independence
and Expansion Independence. On the other hand, we can construct a non-
monotone path solution which satisﬁes Expansion Independence, Contraction
Independence and Weak Eﬃciency, and which violates the monotonicity ax-
iom of Kalai (1977).
4R e s u l t s a n d T h e i r P r o o f s
This section presents our main results and their proofs follow.
Theorem 1: A bargaining solution F is the Nash Solution FNA if and only if
it satisﬁes Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance,a n dContraction
Independence.
Proof. It can be checked that if F = FNA,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes the four axioms
of Theorem 1. We therefore show that if a bargaining solution satisﬁes the
four axioms of Theorem 1, then it must be the Nash solution.
Let F be a bargaining solution satisfying the four axioms of Theorem 1.
For any A ∈ Σ,w eﬁrst show that





i∈N ai,t h e nx 6= F (A).





Suppose to the contrary that x = F (A). Consider B ≡ concomp{x,a}.B y
Contraction Independence, it follows that x ∈ F (B).
Now, by choosing α ∈ Rn
++ appropriately, so that α(a)=( β,...,β)f o r
some β ≡ mini∈N {ai}.D e n o t eB0 ≡ α(B), a0 ≡ α(a), and x0 ≡ α(x). Note
that a0 6= x0.B yScale Invariance, F (B0)=x0.





i∈N ai, C is symmetric, convex, and C ⊇ B0.M o r e o v e r ,
by the construction of B0,b o t ha0 and x0 are eﬃcient on C.B yEﬃciency
5and Symmetry, it follows that F (C)=a0.B y Contraction Indepen-
dence, F (B0)=a0, which is a contradiction. Therefore, x 6= F (A).
From Claim 1, we must then have that, for any A ∈ Σ,
F (A) ⊆
(









Since the right-hand set is a singleton, the non-emptiness of F implies that
F = F NA. ¦
Theorem 2: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the egalitarian Solution if
a n do n l yi fi ts a t i s ﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Contraction Inde-
pendence,a n dExpansion Independence.
Proof. It can be checked that if F = FE,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes the four axioms of
Theorem 2. Therefore, we need only to show that if a solution satisﬁes the
four axioms of Theorem 2, it must be the egalitarian solution.
Let F be a bargaining solution satisfying the four axioms of Theorem 2.
By non-emptiness of F and Weak Eﬃciency, we need only to show the
following claim:
Claim 2: For any A ∈ Σ,a n yx and a that are weakly eﬃcient in A,i f
[ai = aj for any i,j ∈ N], but xi 6= xj for some i,j ∈ N,t h e nx 6= F (A).
Let x and a be such that both are weakly eﬃcient in A and [xi 6= xj for
some i,j ∈ N]. Suppose to the contrary that x = F (A). Consider B ≡
comp{x}.N o t et h a tB ⊆ A.B yContraction Independence, x = F (B).
Consider the set con[∪π∈Ππ(B)], and denote it by C. By construction,
C is a symmetric convex set having C ⊇ B. By the construction of B and
C, x is eﬃcient on C. Therefore, noting that x = F(B), B ⊆ C and x is
eﬃcient on C, x = F (C) follows from Expansion Independence.S i n c eC
is symmetric, by Weak Eﬃciency and Symmetry, F (C)m u s tb ew e a k l y
eﬃcient and be the equal utility point, which is a contradiction. Therefore,
x 6= F (A). This proves Claim 2 and thus Theorem 2. ¦
Theorem 3: A bargaining solution F over Σ is the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solu-
tion if and only if it satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invari-
ance,a n dWeak Contraction Independence,a n dWeak Expansion
Independence.
6Proof. It can be checked that if F = FK,t h e ni ts a t i s ﬁes the ﬁve axioms of
Theorem 3. We therefore show that if a solution satisﬁes the ﬁve axioms of
Theorem 3, it must be the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.
Let F be a solution satisfying the ﬁve axioms of Theorem 3. By non-
emptiness of F and Weak Eﬃciency, we need only to show the following
claim:









mj(A) for some i,j ∈ N], then
x 6= F (A).









mj(A) for some i,j ∈ N]. Suppose to the con-
trary that x = F (A). Consider con({x} ∪ {(mi (A),0−i) | i ∈ N} ∪ {0}),
and denote it by B.N o t et h a tx is eﬃcient on B.B yWeak Contraction
Independence, x = F (B).
By choosing α ∈ Rn
++ appropriately, we have α(m(A)) = (1,...,1). Let
B0 ≡ α(B), a0 ≡ α(a), and x0 ≡ α(x). By Scale Invariance, F (B0)=x0.
Consider the set con[∪π∈Ππ(B0)], and denote it by C. From the construc-
tion, C is a symmetric convex set having C ⊇ B0 and m(C)=m(B0)=
α(m(A)). Moreover, by the construction of B0, x0 is eﬃcient on C.B y
Weak Expansion Independence, F (C)=x0.H o w e v e r , n o t i n g t h a t C
is symmetric, we have, by Weak Eﬃciency and Symmetry,t h a tF (C)
must be the weakly eﬃcient and equal utility point, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, x 6= F (A). This proves Claim 3 and therefore Theorem 3. ¦
Remark 1: It can be veriﬁed that the egalitarian solution is also character-
ized by Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, and Independence of Undom-
inated Alternatives. Note that if we use the axiom Independence of
Undominated Alternatives, which is stronger than Expansion Inde-
pendence, in the characterization of the egalitarian solution, Contraction
Independence becomes superﬂuous and thus can be dropped out.
Remark 2: If #N =2 , then the Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution is character-
ized by Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance,a n dWeak Expansion
Independence. Thus, Weak Contraction Independence is no longer
indispensable to characterize this solution in two person bargaining problems.
7To conclude this section, we make the following observations concerning
the logical independence of the axioms used in each of Theorems 2 and 3.
Proposition 1: The axioms, Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Contraction
Independence, and Expansion Independence are logically independent.
Proof. It is fairly easy to see that there exists a solution which is not egalitar-
ian and which violates one of the three axioms, Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry
and Expansion Independence, respectively, while satisﬁes the respectively
remaining axioms in Theorem 2. Therefore, in what follows, we show that
there exists a bargaining solution which satisﬁes Weak Eﬃciency, Sym-
metry,a n dExpansion Independence, and violates Contraction In-
dependence. For this purpose, we consider the solution F1 to be deﬁned
below. Given λ ∈ [0,1], deﬁne the bargaining solution FλLE as F λLE (A) ≡
λ·F E (A)+(1− λ)·F L (A) for any A ∈ Σ,w h e r eFL : Σ → Rn
+ is the lexico-
graphic egalitarian solution deﬁned as usual. Note that FλLE (A)=F E (A)i f
and only if FE (A)i se ﬃcient on A ∈ Σ.F o ri n s t a n c e ,i fA ∈ Σ is symmetric
or strictly comprehensive, then F E (A)i se ﬃcient on A.L e tΣsc be the set
of all bargaining problems in Σ each of which is also strictly comprehensive.
Now, consider the solution F 1 as follows. For some λ ∈ (0,1), for all
A ∈ Σ,
(1) if A ∈ Σsc or A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+,t h e nF 1(A)=F E(A);
(2) otherwise, F1(A)=FλLE(A).
It can be checked that F1 satisﬁes Symmetry and Weak Eﬃciency.
Next, we show that F1 satisﬁes Expansion Independence.L e tA,B ∈ Σ
be such that A ( B. There are two cases to be distinguished: Case 1:
A ∈ Σsc or A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+,a n dCase 2: neither A ∈ Σsc
nor [A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+]
Case 1: A ∈ Σsc or A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+. In this case, we have
F1(A)=F E(A).
Case 1-1: A ∈ Σsc.I f F1(A)i se ﬃcient on B, then it must be true that
F1(B)=FE(B), and therefore F1(A)=F 1(B). If F 1(A)i sn o te ﬃcient on
B,t h e nt h ea x i o mExpansion Independence is trivially satisﬁed.
Case 1-2: A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+.I fF 1(A)=F E(A)i se ﬃcient
on B,t h e nA must be symmetric, and B must not be the type of comp{y}
for some y ∈ Rn
+. Then, if B ∈ Σsc,t h e nF1(B)=FE(B), so that F1(A)=
8F1(B)b yt h ef a c tt h a tF1(A)i se ﬃcient on B.I fB/ ∈ Σsc,t h e nF 1(B)=
FλLE(B)=F E(A)=F 1(A), since F 1(A)i se ﬃcient on B. If, on the other
hand, F1(A)i sn o te ﬃcient in B, then the axiom Expansion Independence
is trivially satisﬁed.
Case 2: neither A ∈ Σsc nor [A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+]. In this case,
we have F1(A)=F λLE(A).
Case 2-1: FλLE(A)=FE(A). Note that this case is possible whenever
FE(A)i se ﬃcient on A. Then, if F 1(A)i sa l s oe ﬃcient on B,i tm u s tb et r u e
that F 1(A)=FE(B)=FL(B)=F λLE(B). Therefore, F1(A)=F 1(B).
Case 2-2: FλLE(A) 6= F E(A). This case occurs whenever F E(A)i sn o t
eﬃcient on A. Therefore, by deﬁnition, F 1(A)=FλLE(A)i sn o te ﬃcient
on A either. In this case, it is impossible for FλLE(A)t ob ee ﬃcient on B.
Therefore, the axiom Expansion Independence is trivially satisﬁed.
In summary, F1 satisﬁes Expansion Independence.
We next show that F1 violates Contraction Independence.L e tA ∈ Σ
be neither A ∈ Σsc nor [A = comp{x} for some x ∈ Rn
+]. Further, let
A ∈ Σ be such that F E(A)i sn o te ﬃcient on A. Then, F1(A)=F λLE(A) 6=
FE(A). Let B ≡ comp{F1(A)}. Then, by deﬁnition, F1(B)=FE(B) 6=
FλLE(A). Noting that B ( A and F1(A) ∈ B,i tm u s tb et r u et h a tF1
violates Contraction Independence. ¦
Proposition 2: For #N>2, the axioms, Weak Eﬃciency, Symme-
try, Scale Invariance, Weak Contraction Independence, and Weak
Expansion Independence are logically independent.
Proof. Again, it is relatively easy to see that there exists a bargaining solu-
tion that violates each of the axioms, Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale
Invariance,a n dWeak Expansion Independence, respectively, and that
satisﬁes the other remaining axioms, respectively, of Theorem 3. Therefore,
in what follows, we show that there exists a bargaining solution which satisﬁes
Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry, Scale Invariance,a n dWeak Expansion
Independence,b u tv i o l a t e s Weak Contraction Independence.L e t
Σu ≡ {A ∈ Σ | ∀i ∈ N : mi (A)=1 }. W.l.o.g., in the following discussion,
we will focus on the case of #N =3 .F o r# N =3 ,l e t
43 ≡ con{0,(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(0,0,1),(1,0,1),(0,1,1)}.







, which is not
eﬃcient on 43. Consider the following solution, F2,w h i c hi sd e ﬁned below:
Let λ ∈ (0,1) be given, for all A ∈ Σ,
9(1) if A ∈ Σu and,
(1-1) if A ⊆ 43 with F K (43)=F E (43) ∈ A,t h e nF 2(A)=FλLE(A);
(1-2) if otherwise, then F2(A)=F K(A);
(2) if A/ ∈ Σu,t h e nF2(A)=α(F2(B)) for some B ∈ Σu and some α ∈ Rn
++
such that α(B)=A.
It is easy to see that F 2 satisﬁes Symmetry, Scale Invariance,a n d
Weak Eﬃciency. By using a similar method as that in the proof of Propo-
sition 1, we can check that F2 satisﬁes Weak Expansion Independence
and that F2 violates Weak Contraction Independence. ¦
5 Concluding Remarks
Our results on the characterizations of the three solutions are summarized
in the following table.
Table 1
Axioms\ Solutions NS ES KS
(E) ⊕ × ×
(WE) ° ⊕ ⊕
(S) ⊕ ⊕ ⊕
(SI) ⊕ × ⊕
(CI) ⊕ ⊕ ×
(WCI) ° ° ⊕
(EI) × ⊕ ×
(WEI) × ° ⊕
where
NS is for Nash Solution, ES for Egalitarian Solution, and KS for Kalai-
Smorodinsky Solution
⊕ stands for that the axiom is used for the characterization,
10° stands for that the axiom is satisﬁed by the solution,
× stands for that the axiom is violated by the solution.
Clearly, all three solutions satisfy axioms Weak Eﬃciency, Symmetry
and Weak Contraction Independence. The Nash solution satisﬁes all but
Expansion Independence and Weak Expansion Independence, the egalitar-
ian solution satisﬁes all but Eﬃciency and Scale Invariance, and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution violates Eﬃciency, Contraction Independence and Ex-
pansion Independence while satisﬁes all the other axioms. It is also worth
noting that Theorem 2 (resp. Theorem 3) constitutes a strengthening of
the original characterization of the egalitarian solution (resp. the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solution) by Kalai (1977) (resp. Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975)),
since the combination of Contraction Independence and Expansion Indepen-
dence (resp. Weak Contraction Independence and Weak Expansion Inde-
pendence) is logically weaker than the monotonicity axiom (resp.t h eweak
monotonicity axiom).
As far as contraction and expansion properties are concerned, it is in-
t e r e s t i n gt on o t et h a tt h ee g alitarian solution satisﬁes all the contraction
and expansion properties discussed in this paper, the Nash solution fails the
two expansion properties while survives the two contraction properties, and
the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution satisﬁes the weaker versions of contraction
and expansion properties. The fact that the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution has
some constrained contraction and expansion properties gives us some new
insights on the rational choice property of this solution, which the previous
literature does not provide since it is widely considered that it has no rational
choice property.
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